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Abstract
We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market com-
petition indexes such as the Hirschman{Herndahl index, which is aected by the number
of rms and asymmetry of size among these rms: the larger the number of rms (the less
asymmetry among rms), the lower the market concentration index. The literature on mixed
oligopolies suggests that the optimal degree of privatization is increasing with the number
of private rms (and, thus, decreasing with the market competition index), assuming that
all private rms are homogeneous. We investigate how the asymmetry among private rms
aects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model
formulation for discussing asymmetry among private rms. We nd that the optimal de-
gree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monopolistically increasing (and, thus, never
monopolistically decreasing) in the asymmetry among private rms.
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1 Introduction
The Hirschman{Herndahl index (HHI) is the most inuential indicator of the degree of market
concentration and the amount of competition in an industry. It is widely applied in public
policies such as competition law, antitrust, and regulations.1 It is dened as the sum of the
squares of the market shares of the rms within the industry and is aected by the number of
the rms and the asymmetry among the sizes of the rms; the larger the number of rms (i.e.,
the less asymmetry among rms), the lower the market concentration index.
In the literature on mixed oligopolies2, many papers have already investigated the relation-
ship between the optimal privatization policy and the market concentration index by examining
how the number of the private rms aects the privatization policy.3 De Fraja and Delbono
(1989) formulated a model of mixed oligopolies in which a public enterprise competes against
n private rms in a homogeneous product market. They assumed that both public and private
rms have an identical cost function and showed that the full privatization more likely improves
welfare when n is larger. Matsumura and Shimizu (2010) showed that this result holds even
when multiple public rms exist and the cost dierence between public and private rms is
allowed, regardless of whether the products are homogeneous or dierentiated. Lin and Mat-
sumura (2012) adopted a partial privatization approach formulated by Matsumura (1998) and
showed that the optimal degree of privatization is increasing with the number of private rms.
Matsumura and Okamura (2015) showed that this is true even when private rms maximize
relative prot rather than absolute prots.4
All the papers mentioned above assumed that private rms are symmetric (homogeneous).
1See Viscusi et al. (2005).
2For important examples of mixed oligopolies and recent development of the analysis of mixed oligopolies, see
Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Gil-Molto et al. (2011), Bose et al. (2014), and Matsumura and Tomaru (2015).
3Throughout this study, we dene HHI as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the private rms
among private rms. The output of the public rm is directly aected by the privatization policy, and thus, we
exclude it to discuss the relationship between market index and the optimal privatization policy.
4The relative prot maximization approach enables us to treat various competition structures, from collusive to
perfectly competitive cases, by the single quantity competition model. Thus, this result implies that the optimal
degree of privatization is increasing with the number of private rms under various competition structures. For
the discussion of relative prot maximization, see Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Matsumura et al.
(2013).
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Therefore, these results suggest that the lesser the market is concentrated, the more the govern-
ment should privatize the public rms. However, as mentioned above, the market concentration
index also depends on the heterogeneity among rms. Thus, we should more carefully inves-
tigate the relationship between the market concentration index and the optimal privatization
policy when the heterogeneity among the rms is non-negligible. For example, Japanese nan-
cial markets are a typical example of mixed oligopolies in which public nancial institutions
such as Development Bank of Japan, Japan Finance Corporation, Postal Bank, and Kampo
compete against private banks and life-insurance companies, and there is huge heterogeneity
among private banks and life-insurance companies in some markets. The Vietnamese economy
is another example. Many state-owned rms in Vietnam compete against private rms across
a wide variety of industries and the size of private rms are far from homogeneous (Huang and
Yang, 2016).
In this study, we formulate the simplest model to discuss how heterogeneity of private en-
terprises aects the optimal privatization policy. We investigate a triopoly model in which one
public enterprise competes against two private enterprises. We nd that the optimal degree of
privatization is either increasing with the degree of asymmetry between rms or nonmonotone
and decreasing (increasing) when the asymmetry is small (large).
This result has an important implication because in contrast with the results in the literature
on mixed oligopolies, here, it is ambiguous whether the government should privatize the public
rm more when the market concentration index such as HHI is smaller. If the market concen-
tration index is larger because of the smaller number of private rms, the government should
privatize less. However, if it is larger because of the larger asymmetry among private rms,
the government should privatize more. Therefore, when we consider the optimal privatization
policy, we should pay more attention to the reason for the market index being large.
As mentioned above, the Japanese nancial markets are typical mixed oligopolies. Postal
Bank, a major public nancial institution, competes with many small regional private banks
with relatively homogeneous size. On the contrary, Development Bank of Japan, another major
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public nancial institution, competes with a smaller number of mega banks, smaller-sized re-
gional banks, and further smaller private funds, with signicant heterogeneity of the size, in the
corporate loan markets and founding for corporate revitalization. Our result suggests that the
optimal degree of privatization is higher in Postal Bank than in Japan Development Bank. This
is consistent with the following current privatization policies in Japan. The government has
already partially privatized Postal Bank and plans to reduce its ownership share in it, whereas
the government postponed the privatization of Development Bank of Japan.
2 The Model
We formulate a mixed triopoly model. Firm 0 is a state-owned public rm. Firms 1 and 2
are private rms. These rms produce homogeneous products. The market demand function is
given by
p(Q) = a Q;
where p denotes the price, a is positive constant, and Q is the total output.
Regarding cost functions, we consider the following situation.5 Each factory has the following
cost structure. It takes F as the set-up cost and (k=2)q2 as the variable cost, where q is the
output produced at this factory and k is a positive constant. If a rm i holds mi factories, it
allocates the same production level among factories, and thus, its cost is
ci(qi) =
k
2mi
q2i +miF:
We assume thatm0 = 1 andm1+m2 = m. Without loss of generality, we assume thatm1  m=2
or equivalently, m1  m2. Therefore, a larger m1 implies more asymmetry between the private
rms.
Each private rm's objective is its respective prot, which is given by
i = p(Q)qi   ci(qi):
5Linear demand and quadratic cost functions are very popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See De
Fraja and Delbono (1989). See also Matsumura and Shimizu (2010) and the works cited therein.
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Following the standard approach in the literature formulated by Matsumura (1998), we as-
sume that the public rm's objective function is a convex combination of social surplus and its
respective prot. This is denoted as

 = 0 + (1  )W
where W is the social surplus, given by
W =
Z Q
0
p(q)dq   pQ+
2X
i=0
i =
Z Q
0
p(q)dq  
2X
i=0
ci(qi);
and  2 [0; 1] represents the degree of privatization. In the case of full nationalization (i:e:;  =
0), rm 0 maximizes social welfare. In the case of full privatization (i:e:;  = 1), rm 0 maximizes
its own prot.
The game runs as follows. In the rst stage, the government chooses the degree of privatiza-
tion  to maximize the social surplus. In the second stage, each rm simultaneously chooses its
output to maximize its objective. We solve this game by backward induction and the equilibrium
concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Results
First, we solve the second-stage game, given . The rst-order conditions of public and private
rms are, respectively,
@

@q0
= a  (1 + + k)q0   q1   q2 = 0; (1)
@1
@q1
= a  (2 + k
m1
)q1   q0   q2 = 0; (2)
@1
@q1
= a  (2 + k
m m1 )q2   q0   q1 = 0: (3)
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The second-order conditions are satised. From (1){(3), we obtain the following reaction func-
tions of public and private rms, respectively:
R0(q1; q2) =
a  q1   q2
1 + + k
;
R1(q0; q2) =
m1(a  q0   q2)
2m1 + k
;
R2(q0; q1) =
(m m1)(a  q0   q1)
2(m m1) + k :
These reaction functions lead to the following equilibrium quantities of public and private rms,
respectively:
q0 =
a(m1 + k)(k +m m1)
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + kf(2k + 2+ 1)m+ (k + + 1)kg ;
q1 =
am1(k + )(k +m m1)
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + kf(2k + 2+ 1)m+ (k + + 1)kg ;
q2 =
a(m1 + k)(k + )(m m1)
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + kf(2k + 2+ 1)m+ (k + + 1)kg :
The resulting equilibrium total output, price, and welfare are, respectively,
Q =
afm1(2k + 2+ 1)(m m1) + (1 + )km+ k2(m+ 1)g
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + kf(2k + 2+ 1)m+ (k + + 1)kg ;
p =
a(k + )(k +m1)(k +m m1)
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + kf(2k + 2+ 1)m+ (k + + 1)kg ;
W  =
a2X1
2[(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + kf(2k + 2+ 1)m+ (k + + 1)kg]2   (m+ 1)F;
where X1  f8(k+)+5k+6+1g(m m1)2m21+kf9(k+)2+8k+10+2g(m m1)mm1+
2k2(3k+4+1)(m m1)m1+ k2f3(k+)2+3k+4+1gm2+ k3f(+ k)2+4k+6+2gm+
k4(k + 2+ 1).
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) q0 is increasing in m1. (ii) q1 is increasing in m1. (iii) q2 is decreasing in
m1. (iv) q

1 + q

2 is decreasing in m1. (v) Q
 is decreasing in m1.
Proof
Taking the rst-order derivative of equilibrium quantities of public and private rms and equi-
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librium total output with respect to m1, we obtain
@q0
@m1
=
ak(k + )(m+ 2k)(2m1  m)
f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 > 0;
@q1
@m1
=
ak(k + )X2
f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 > 0;
@q2
@m1
=   ak(k + )X3f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 < 0;
@q1
@m1
+
@q2
@m1
=   ak(k + )(k + + 1)(m+ 2k)(2m1  m)f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 < 0;
@Q
@m1
=   ak(k + )
2(m+ 2k)(2m1  m)
f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 < 0;
where
X2  f2(+ k) + 1g(m m1)2 + 2k(+ k + 1)(m m1) + (+ k)m21 + k(1 + k)m+ k2(1 + ) + k3;
X3  (k + )f(m m1)2 +m21g+m21 + kf(m+m1) + 2m1g+ k2(1 + +m+ 2m1) + k3:
These results imply Proposition 1. 
An increase in m1 reduces (raises) rm 1's (rm 2's) marginal cost, and thus, the output of
rm 1 (rm 2) is increasing (decreasing) in m1 (Proposition 1(ii) and (iii)). Proposition 1(iv)
states that the total output of the private rms is decreasing in m1, and this result (a higher rate
of market concentration among private rms makes the market less competitive) is very natural.
Because rm 0's reaction curve has a negative slope (strategic substitute), rm 0 expands its
output as m1 increases, responding to the reduction of the private rms' outputs (Proposition
1(i)). The direct eect of the reduction of the private rms' outputs dominates the indirect
eect of the increase of the public rm's output, and thus, the total output decreases as m1
increases (Proposition 1(v)). Because the price is increasing in m1, we believe that m1 is an
appropriate parameter reecting the intensity of market competition.
We now present a relationship between price{cost margins and m1.
Proposition 2 (i) p   c00(q0) is nondecreasing in m1 and increasing in m1 for  > 0. (ii)
p   c01(q1) is increasing in m1. (iii) p   c02(q2) is decreasing in m1.
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Proof
Taking the dierence between the equilibrium price and the marginal cost of the public and the
private rms, we obtain
p   c00(q0) =
a(k +m1)(k +m m1)
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)  f0(m1);
p   c01(q1) =
a(k + )m1(k +m m1)
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)  f1(m1);
p   c02(q2) =
a(k + )(k +m1)(m m1)
(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)  f2(m1):
Dierentiating these outcomes with respect to m1 leads to the following results:
@f0(m1)
@m1
=
ak(k + )(2k +m)(2m1  m)
f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 > 0; (4)
@f1(m1)
@m1
=
ak(k + )X4
f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 > 0; (5)
@f2(m1)
@m1
=   ak(k + )[(k + )f(m m1)
2 + kmg+ (k + + 1)(k +m1)2]
f(3k + 3+ 1)(m m1)m1 + k(2k + 2+ 1)m  k2(k + + 1)g2 < 0; (6)
where X4  f2(k+)+1g(m m1)2+(k+)(m21+km)+2k(k++1)(m m1)+k2(k++1):
The strict inequality in (4) is satised if  > 0. These imply Proposition 2. 
The larger the private rm, the larger is the dierence between the price and marginal revenue
(i.e., p   p0qi). Therefore, the price{cost margin of rm 1 (rm 2) is increasing (decreasing) in
m1. Because the public rm's marginal cost is independent of m1 and the price is increasing in
m1, the price{cost margin of rm 0 is increasing in m1 as long as  > 0.
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Next, we discuss the government's welfare maximization problem in the rst stage. From
the rst-order condition @W =@ = 0, we obtain7
 =
2km21(m m1)2 + 2k2(m  k)(m m1)m1 + k3m2
m21(m m1)2 + 3k(m+ 2k)(m m1)m1 + k2(m2 + 3km+ k2)
: (7)
We now present our main result, which shows the relationship between  and m1.
Proposition 3 (i) If m  m  (p17 + 1)k=4, then  is increasing in m1 for (m2 ;m]. (ii) If
6If  = 0, welfare-maximizing public rm (rm 0) chooses its quantity so as to equalize its marginal cost to
the price, and thus, price{cost margin of rm 0 is zero in equilibrium, regardless of m1.
7The second-order condition is satised.
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m > m, then the relationship between m1 and  is nonmonotone. When m1 is close to m=2
(m),  is decreasing (increasing) in m1.
Proof From (7), we obtain
@
@m1
=
k2(2m1  m)X5
f(m m1)2m21 + 3k(m+ 2k)(m m1)m1 + k2(m2 + 3km+ k2)g2
; (8)
where
X5(m1)  2(2m+ 7k)(2m m1)m31 + 4(k  m)(m2 + 4km+ k2)m21 (9)
  2km(m2 + 6km+ 2k2)m1 + k2(m3 + 2km2 + 4k2m+ 2k3):
Since the denominator of (8) is positive and k2(2m1 m) in the numerator of (8) is positive for
m1 >
m
2 , the sign of (8) is equal to that of X5.
From (9), we obtain
lim
m1!m
X5(m1) = k
2(m3 + 2km2 + 4k2m+ 2k3); (10)
lim
m1!m2
X5(m1) =
(m+ 2k)3(2k2 + km  2m2)
8
: (11)
(10) is positive. (11) is nonnegative (negative) if m  m (m > m).
Because (8) is always positive when m1 is close to m and negative when m1 is close to m=2
as long as m > m; Proposition 3(ii) holds.
Suppose that m  m. Dierentiating X5(m1) with respect to m1 yields
@X5(m1)
@m1
= 2(2m1  m)f2m1(2m+ 7k)(m m1) + k(m2 + 6km+ 2k2)g: (12)
This is nonnegative for m1 2 [m2 ;m] and strictly positive for m1 2 (m2 ;m]. Therefore, X5(m1)
is positive for m1 2 (m2 ;m] if m  m. This leads to Proposition 3(i). 
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Figure 1 (2) illustrates the case of monotone (nonmonotone) relationship between  and
m1.
Lin and Matsumura (2012) and Matsumura and Okamura (2015) have already shown that the
optimal degree of privatization is increasing with the number of the private rms when rms are
homogeneous. A larger  decreases the output of rm 0 because that rm is less concerned with
consumer surplus (Matsumura, 1998). Through strategic interaction, it increases the output of
each private rm. As long as the marginal cost is higher in the public rm than in each private
rm, this production substitution improves the production eciency in the industry and thus
improves welfare. We call this eect the \production{substitution eect." Simultaneously, an
increase in  reduces the total output and reduces welfare. We call this eect the \total output
eect." When the number of private rms is larger, the output of each private rm is smaller,
and thus, the marginal cost of each private rm is smaller. Therefore, the more private rms, the
stronger this welfare-improving production-substitution eect is. When the number of private
rms is larger, the total output is larger, and thus, a welfare loss caused by a reduction of total
output is smaller. These two eects yield the result that the optimal degree of privatization is
increasing with the number of private rms.
Proposition 1 states that an increase in m1 reduces the total output. Thus, by the total
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output eect, the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in m1. Proposition 2 states that
an increase in m1 increases the price{cost margin in the larger rm (rm 1) and reduces it in
the smaller rm (rm 2). Therefore, production substitution from rm 0 to rm 1 (rm 2) is
more (less) important as m1 increases. The slope of the reaction curve is more (less) steep as
m1 increases, and an increase in  more (less) signicantly aects rm 1's (rm 2's) output.
Therefore, the production{substitution eect is more eective as m1 increases, and this eect
dominates the total output eect, especially when m1 is large. Consequently, the optimal degree
of privatization is increasing in m1.
4 Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigate the relationship between a privatization policy and the asymmetry
among private rms that compete with a public rm. We nd that the optimal degree of priva-
tization of the public rm is either increasing with or has a nonmonotone (U-shape) relationship
with the degree of asymmetry among private rms.
In this study, we propose a reasonable model formulation allowing cost dierence among
private rms. In the literature on mixed oligopolies, a cost dierence between public and private
rms is often assumed8, most works do not consider a cost dierence among private rms. The
cost asymmetry among private rms may have a signicant implication in mixed oligopolies,
and future research needs to investigate this problem in other contexts in mixed oligopolies.
Our triopoly model is the simplest model allowing a cost dierence among private rms.
However, even this model requires some messy calculations, and extending our analysis to a
more general oligopoly model is a challenging task. However, as Haraguchi and Matsumura
(2016) showed, the property of mixed oligopoly may change as the number of private rms
exceeds a critical value. Therefore, extending our analysis to an n-rm oligopoly may be a
promising future research topic.
In this study, we assume that both rms are domestic. In the literature on mixed oligopolies,
8See Matsumura and Shimizu (2010). For the empirical and theoretical works discussing the cost dierence
between public and private rms, see Megginson and Netter (2001) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2004).
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the nationality of the private rms aects the equilibrium outcomes, especially aecting the
optimal privatization policy.9 Extending our analysis to this direction remains a scope for
future research.
9Whether the private rm is domestic or foreign often yields contrasting results in the literature on mixed
oligopoly. See Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Barcena-Ruiz and
Garzon (2005 a,b). The optimal degree of privatization is decreasing with the foreign ownership rate in private
rms when the number of private rms is given exogenously (Lin and Matsumura, 2012), while it is increasing in
free-entry markets (Cato and Matsumura, 2012).
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